Although a great deal of research has been done on electronic cash schemes with blind multisignatures to prevent an insider attack, there is no discussion of a formal security model in the literature. Firstly we discussed the security model of e-cash schemes based on the blind multisignature scheme against a (restricted) attack model and proposed a concrete scheme proven to be secure in the model [1]; however, this attack model disallows an attacker from corrupting an issuing bank and shops in the forgery game. In this paper, first, we reconsider the security model to remove the restriction of the attack model. Second, we propose a new untraceable e-cash scheme with a blind multisignature scheme and prove that the proposed scheme is secure against the (non-restricted) attacks under the DDH assumption in the random oracle model. key words: blind multisignature, electronic cash, provable security, random oracle model, insider attacks
Introduction

Background
On-line business involving electronic commerce has become widespread and many applications are researched. In particular, since the electronic cash (e-cash) scheme is a basic primitive, much research has been done on this topic. The security requirements for e-cash schemes are untraceability to honest users, traceability to dishonest users and unforgeability of e-cash. In order to realize the untraceability, Chaum proposed a blind signature scheme [2] .
The blind signature scheme consists of three entities: a signer, a user and a verifier. The signer issues a signature for a message concealed by the user. The verifier checks whether the signature is valid or not with a public key of the signer. Recently, many provably secure blind signature schemes has been proposed [3] - [5] .
There are various untraceable e-cash schemes [6] - [9] in which shops can verify the validity of the e-cash off-line. In these schemes, from the blindness of the blind signature, no one can correspond the e-cash to the user. The user's privacy is protected by using the blind signature scheme, but the user is specified (traceable) if he spends the same ecash twice (double-spending, hereafter). This traceability to dishonest users restrains double-spending. † † The authors are with The University of Electro-Communications, Chofu-shi, 182-8585 Japan.
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An untraceable e-cash scheme suffers from an insider attack as follows. Assume that only one bank issues e-cash as in [6] - [9] . In this setting, if an employee of the bank steals the bank's private key, he can issue the e-cash infinitely, and so the bank may suffer a heavy loss. One of the solutions is to split the issuing function among several banks: if some of the banks are trustworthy, then this attack can be prevented.
Moreover, this solution also increases the robustness of the e-cash system since, even if some secret keys of banks are leaked, the validity of e-cash is guaranteed by the other banks. Note that, in the case where only one bank issues ecash and the secret key of the bank is leaked or plural banks issue e-cash and the secret keys of these banks, the corresponding e-cash is invalidated.
The simple way to split the function is to concatenate the conventional blind signatures (e-cash) signed by several banks separately. However, it is inefficient: the signature length (the size of e-cash) is n times as large as that of conventional blind signatures, and the scheme requires computation cost and the number of transactions is n times compared to the conventional blind signatures, where n denotes the number of banks. Another way is to use a blind threshold signature scheme [10] . A k out of n blind threshold signature scheme is protocols allowing any subset of k signers out of n to generate a signature, but which does not allow a valid signature to be generated if fewer than k signers participate in the protocol. With a blind threshold signature, the verifier can confirm that more than k signers of n participate in the signing protocol; however, no one can detect the k signers from it. Therefore, when trouble occurs, some banks may compensate for e-cash even if the banks have not issued it.
Our solution is to use a blind multisignature scheme [11] allowing plural signers to generate a signature by cooperating with one another. With a multisignature, the verifier can specify the signers who participate in the signing protocol. So, the blind multisignature schemes seem suitable for the e-cash scheme because the banks need not compensate for e-cash they have not issued.
In the blind multisignature scheme, there are three entities: a group of signers, a user and a verifier. The signers cooperate with each other to produce a blind signature for a message hidden by the user. The verifier can check the validity of the blind multisignature by using the public keys of corresponding signers. If the issuing function by a blind multisignature scheme is split among several banks and at least one of the banks is trustworthy, then the insider attack Copyright c 2007 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers can be avoided.
Related Works
A partially blind signature scheme [12] , [13] is a blind signature scheme such that a partial message is not blinded. This unblinded message allows the signer and the user to implant a tag key.
In [9] , Abe proposed a provably secure blind signature scheme with polynomially many signatures by improving the partially blind signature scheme of [13] . This scheme allows the user to blind the tag key so that the resulting signature can be verified with the signer's public key and the blinded tag key concealed by the user. An untraceable ecash scheme with the blind signature scheme was also proposed in [9] .
The notion of the multisignatures was introduced by Itakura and Nakamura [14] . In the multisignature scheme, multiple signers cooperate with one another to generate one signature for a message; the aim of the multisignature scheme is to reduce the length of the signature compared to that of concatenation of individual signatures. Micali et al. [15] provided a formal model for multisignature schemes, and proposed a provably secure multisignature scheme under the discrete logarithm assumption.
Horster et al. [11] introduced a notion of a blind multisignature scheme by applying the notion of the blind signature scheme to the multisignature scheme and proposed a concrete blind multisignature scheme based on a metablind signature scheme. The blind multisignature scheme is utilized for constructing secure e-cash and e-voting systems free from insider attack. Subsequently, Chen et al. [16] proposed another concrete scheme from a bilinear map. Unfortunately, the above two concrete blind multisignature schemes are not proven to be secure, and therefore, the security of the e-cash or e-voting system is questionable.
Our Contribution
We introduced the formal security model of the untraceable e-cash schemes with the blind multisignature scheme and proposed a provably secure scheme whose size of e-cash is independent of the number of banks, which overcomes the problems discussed in the above related works; however, the security of this scheme is considered only for a restricted attack model, and its security is questionable for a non-restricted attack model. In the scheme of [1] , the only issuing bank uses the tag key that enables banks to trace dishonest users and the other guaranteeing banks do not, and so the security cannot be proven against the non-restricted attack model where the attacker can fully corrupt † the issuing bank. Moreover, [1] insists that if the scheme is modified by making the guaranteeing bank use its own tag key, and therefore, the security of the modified scheme can be proven even if the issuing bank is corrupted † † . However, the theorem 5 of [1] is not concerned about the model where the shops are corrupted in the forgery game of [1] ; namely, the security is not ensured when the shops are dishonest.
In this paper, we construct a new untraceable e-cash scheme that is provably secure against non-restricted attacks under the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model [17] . In the proposed scheme, not only the issuing bank but the guaranteeing banks also use the tag key in order to ensure security against the full corruption of banks in the non-restricted attack manner. The size of e-cash depends on the number of banks because the e-cash contains proofs of the knowledge of each bank for the blinded tag key: We decrease the size by making the banks use the common tag key to generate the blinded tag key. Moreover, in order to ensure security against the corruption of shops, we add another proof in the e-cash. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the definitions of intractable problems on which our proposed scheme is based, the concept of an e-cash scheme with plural banks and its security requirements. In Sects. 3 and 4, we describe the proposed e-cash scheme and prove its security, respectively. In Sect. 5, we will discuss the efficiency of the proposed scheme.
Definitions
Preliminaries
Let us review the definitions of the discrete logarithm (DL) problem and the decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [18] , and discuss the security requirements for the e-cash schemes with plural banks. Definition 1: (Negligible) We say that a function ν(·) is negligible (for n) if for all constant c, there exists N such that for all n > N, ν(n) < 1/n c . We write such negligible function ν(·) as negl, hereafter.
Definition 2: (Discrete Logarithm Problem and Decision
Diffie-Hellman Problem [18] ) Let G be a group of order p, where p is prime.
• A DL algorithm A for G is a probabilistic polynomial time (in |p|) algorithm with success probability
where g is a generator of G. The group G satisfies the DL assumption if there is no DL algorithm A for G with non-negligible success probability.
• A DDH algorithm A for G is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm with advantage Key Generation G is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes a security parameter k as an input and outputs a pair of public and secret keys (pk, sk). After generating the key pair, the bank registers its public key to the trusted third party PKI using zero-knowledge interactive proof (ZKIP, [19] , [20] ) for the knowledge of her secret key. Issuing Protocol Each B i takes the key pair pk i , sk i produced by G(1 k ), and U is given a set of public keys {pk i } i . {B i } i and U engage in the interactive protocol with some polynomial number of rounds. At the end of this issuing protocol, each B i outputs either success or fail, and U outputs either success or fail. U obtains e-cash when U outputs success. Payment Protocol U sends e-cash with a request to S which is given public keys {pk i } i . U and S engage in the interactive protocol with some polynomial number of rounds. At the end of this payment protocol, U outputs either success or fail, and S outputs either accept or reject. When S accepts, S records the transaction histories. Here, the transaction histories means the data for the payment protocol itself without the user information such as ID of U or IP address. Clearing Protocol S gives the used e-cash and corresponding transaction histories to B. Then B outputs either accept or reject. B sends real money to S when B outputs accept. The difference between the RAIA and the AIA is as follows. The RAIA attacker is disallowed from controlling the corrupted participants or from pretending to be the corrupted participants with their secret keys. On the other hand, the AIA attacker can control the corrupted participants, and can pretend to be the corrupted participants.
Manner of Attack on E-cash Scheme
Note that the concrete scheme of [1] is proven to be secure against ACMA & RAIA. This paper aims to propose a new e-cash scheme that is secure against ACMA & AIA.
Security Requirements for Untraceable E-cash Scheme with Plural Banks
We describe the security requirements for the untraceable e-cash with plural banks as follows. We maintain that an untraceable e-cash scheme is secure against ACMA & AIA, if the scheme satisfies the following five requirements.
Definition 5: (Correctness) Let (pk, sk) be a key pair generated by the key generation algorithm G properly. The untraceable e-cash scheme satisfies the correctness if, (i) following the issuing protocol, {B i } i and U always output success, (ii) following the payment protocol, U and S always output success and accept, with ({pk i } i , e-cash) issued by {B i } i and U correctly, and (iii) {B i } i always outputs accept with ({pk i } i , e-cash, transaction history) generated by (i) and (ii).
We define the untraceability that preserves the privacy of honest users. In untraceable e-cash scheme, no one can correctly detect the user who used the e-cash even if the ecash (e-cash and transaction history † ) is analyzed. • D * corrupts arbitrary banks {B * i } i and a shop S * adaptively.
• D * executes the issuing protocols and payment protocols with U 0 and U 1 by controlling corrupted {B * i } i and S * .
In arbitrary timing, D * executes the issuing protocols † Note that the e-cash and the transaction histories do not contain information of U such as the ID, IP address, and the shipping address. In some applications (systems) where this information of U is transferred, this information or these items of information of U are transferred, they should be treated properly. For example, the anonymous channel [21] ensures the anonymous payment system for the on-line service and the dual signature [22] , [23] ) realizes the anonymous shipping service. This paper discusses the untraceability of the e-cash scheme as the primitive (not the system) and does not deal with these aspects.
with U 0 and U 1 with the same list L * . The users then randomly choose b ∈ {0, 1} and U * b runs the payment protocol with S * . Finally,
Since the e-cash is electronic data and easily reproducible, the e-cash scheme must prevent the double spending. To restrain it, the following traceability to dishonest users is required for the untraceable e-cash schemes. D is given
The traceability restrains the dishonest users from spending the same e-cash twice; however, the users may produce different e-cash more than the executions of issuing protocol and use them without being traced. The following one-more unforgeability ensures that no one can obtain l + 1 e-cash by running the issuing protocol l times.
Definition 8: (One-more Unforgeability of E-cash) The ecash scheme is (l, l + 1)-unforgeable against ACMA & AIA, if no polynomial-time machine F can win the following game with non-negligible probability.
In arbitrary timing, F executes the following.
• F can corrupt arbitrary banks and shops except the attack target bank(s).
• F can execute the issuing protocol at most l time with the attack target bank(s).
• F can execute the payment protocol with S * .
• F can query the random oracles about the digests for arbitrary messages at most q h times.
F wins the game if F outputs untraceable (l + 1) pairs of e-cash and transaction histories where the e-cash are issued or guaranteed by the attack target bank(s).
The unissuability prevents issuing of e-cash by the banks without the user's agreement.
Definition 9: (Unissuability without User's Permission)
The e-cash scheme is unissuable without user's permission, if no banks can correctly execute the issuing protocol without the user's agreement.
Proposed Scheme
As we mentioned, the concrete scheme of [1] is secure against only the ACMA & RAIA. This section proposes a new untraceable e-cash scheme with a blind multisignature scheme that is secure against ACMA & AIA. We construct the blind multisignature scheme from the blind signature scheme proposed by Abe [9] .
(1) Assumptions
For the simplicity, we assume that there is trusted third party PKI that sets up a system parameter and authorizes a public key generated by each bank.
Let {B 0 , B 1 , . . . , B n−1 } be a group of banks that cooperate to issue e-cash. Each bank has three kinds of keys; an individual issuing key, an individual guaranteeing key, and the common tag key. The banks use these keys as follows. The bank uses its issuing key and tag key to issue the e-cash. Specifically, the issuing key ensures that the e-cash is issued by the issuing bank, and the tag key enables the issuing bank to trace a dishonest user who spends the same e-cash twice. On the other hand, the bank utilizes the guaranteeing key to guarantee the e-cash issued by the other issuing banks.
Let U be a user who has a savings account at the issuing bank † B 0 . U asks B 0 and several guaranteeing banks (chosen by U) to issue e-cash. Let L ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} be a list of banks' IDs chosen by U, a||b be a concatenation of strings a and b, and i∈{0,...,n−1} (β 1,i ||β 2,i ||η i ) = β 1,0 ||β 2,0 ||η 0 || . . . ||β 1,n−1 ||β 2,n−1 ||η n−1 . Here we assume that each participant sequentially executes the key generation protocol.
Each user uses the signature scheme (Gen, Sign, Verify) confirmed to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack (EUF-ACMA) [24] . guarantee banks issuing bank user 
Initialization
The PKI runs a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm with security parameter k to generate the system parameter (p, q, g, h, z) where p and q are large primes that satisfy q|p − 1, and g is a generator of the group g ⊆ Z * p whose order is q, and randomly selects h, z ∈ g . If h, z = 1, then PKI throws away the parameters and tries to set new parameters again. The PKI also publishes the following three hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → g and H 2 , H 3 : {0, 1} * → Z q .
Key Generation Protocol
Each bank B i (i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1) selects private keys x 1,i , x 2,i ∈ R Z q and computes an issuing public key y 1,i ← g x 1,i mod p and a guaranteeing public key y 2,i ← g x 2,i mod p. Then B i proves the knowledge of its private keys x 1,i = log g y 1,i and x 2,i = log g y 2,i to the PKI with ZKIP † [20] . If the ZKIP protocol completes, the PKI registers the public keys. The public and private keys of B i are (y 1,i , y 2,i ) and (x 1,i , x 2,i ), respectively. Each user U executes (pk U , sk U ) ← Gen, and registers her public key pk U and her ID ID U to the PKI.
Issuing Protocol
Let L = {0; j, . . . , k} be a list of IDs of banks participating in issuing e-cash where k ≤ n − 1. 0 is an ID of the issuing bank, and { j, . . . , k} are IDs of the guaranteeing banks. Hereafter, all arithmetic operations are processed in Z p unless otherwise noted. Figure 1 shows the flows of issuing protocol.
Step 
and rnd are sent to U.
Step 5. U checks whether b 1,i , b 2,i ∈ g holds or not.
If it does not hold, U outputs fail. Otherwise, U also computes z 1 ← H 1 (rnd||σ U ). U selects γ ∈ Z q at random, and uses it to compute blind tag keys
. U then converts the commitments a, {b 1,i } i∈L and {b 2,i } i∈L into α ← ag t 1 y 
If the above equations hold, U converts the answers to
and checks whether (ρ, {ω i , σ 1,i , σ 2,i , µ i , δ i } i∈L ) satisfies the following Eq.(4) or not.
and records (e-cash, τ, γ) on a database of U.
Payment Protocol
U uses the e-cash (ζ, ζ 1 , ρ, {ω i , σ 1,i , σ 2,i , µ i , δ i } i , L) at a shop S as follows.
Step 1. U sends the e-cash to S.
Step 2. S selects a challenge cha ∈ {0, 1} * , and sends cha to U.
Step 3. U computes p ← H 3 (z τ ||e-cash||cha) and µ p ← τ − p γ mod q, and sends (µ p , p ) to S.
Step 4. S checks whether both Eq. (5) and Eq.(6) hold or not:
If both equations hold, then S sends a service or goods to U and records the e-cash and the transaction histories (cha, µ p , p ) in its database.
Cleaning Protocol
Afterward, S sends the used e-cash and its transaction histories to the issuing bank B 0 . If the e-cash with the transaction histories is not in the database of B 0 , then B 0 sends real money to S and records the e-cash with the transaction histories. Otherwise, B 0 refuses the exchange in order to avoid the cleaning for the same e-cash twice maliciously. After the cleaning, B 0 checks whether the e-cash is in its database (i.e., the double spending) or not. When B 0 finds the double spending, B 0 traces † the dishonest user and makes a demand for money to exchange it. B 0 refuses the exchange.
Security Considerations
In this section, we prove that our scheme satisfies the correctness, the untraceability for honest users, the traceability to dishonest users who try the double spending, the unforgeability and the unissuability without the user's permission.
Correctness
If all participants follow the protocols, the proposed scheme works properly. † B 0 cannot trace the dishonest user if the hash values collide (with negligible probability). In this case, B 0 compensates.
Theorem 1:
If the banks {B i } i , the user U and the shop S follow the protocols; {B i } i and U output success and e-cash in the issuing protocol, respectively, and S accepts the resulting e-cash with probability 1 in the payment protocol, and {B i } i accept the resulting e-cash and these transaction histories with overwhelming probability in the cleaning protocol.
Proof. We show that the resulting e-cash satisfies the following equations with probability 1 if U, {B i } i∈L and S follow the issuing and payment protocols.
We first show that (r, {c i , (7) log g
Eq. (1) holds. Eq. (2) can be proved in the same manner. Next, we show the resulting e-cash = (ζ, 
Similarly, from the second equation of Eq(2), h
from the equation of Eq(3), and moreover, µ i = τ i −γδ i holds for ∀i ∈ L, which implies
From the above equations, Eq. (4) holds.
Finally, we show that (µ p , τ p ) satisfies Eq. (5) and Eq.(6) if U and S follow the payment protocol.
µ p = τ − p γ mod q holds because of the step 3 of the payment protocol, so z
Therefore, Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) hold, too.
On the other hand, no pair of the e-cash and the transaction histories exist with non-negligible probability if all participants are honest. So the banks always output accept in the cleaning protocol.
Untraceability for Honest Users
We show that as long as a user spends the e-cash only once, no one can trace the user if the DDHP is intractable. • {B i } i issues the e-cash to each honest users U 0 and U 1 . Let V bB * be a set of views of {B * i } i during the issuing protocol with U b .
• One of the e-cash issued to U 0 or U 1 is used at S * . Let V bS * be view of S * during the payment protocol with the e-cash issued to U b .
• D * is given (V 0B * , V 1B * , V bS * ), and outputs b .
We assume that ({B * i }, S * , D * ) holds
where is non-negligible. We will construct an algorithm D that can solve the DDH problem by using ({B * }, S * , D * ) as oracles.
Step 1. With an input Π = (p, A, B, C, D) , D fixes a system parameter (p, q, g, h, z) as follows. D sets an input p to the system parameter as it is. q is an order of A , and g ← A. h is chosen randomly in g and z ← g κ with random κ ∈ Z q . Then D simulates PKI to run the key generation protocol with {B i } i .
Step 2. D selects b ∈ R {0, 1}. D * simulates two users U 0 and U 1 to run the issuing and payment protocols with {B * i } i , S * and D * .
Step 3. U 0 sends her ID, L, msg 0 and σ U 0 to B * 0 to execute the issuing protocol. We call the execution run 0 . If B * 0 asks a random string rnd and σ U 0 to H 1 and if
0 asks rnd and σ U 0 to H 1 and if b = 1, D answers z 1 ∈ g at random.
Step 4. U 1 sends her ID and L which is the same list utilized in the run 0 , msg 1 and σ U 1 to B * 0 to execute the issuing protocol. We call the execution run 1 . If B * 0 asks rnd and σ U 1 to H 1 and if b = 1, then D simulates
0 asks rnd and σ U 1 to H 1 and if b = 0, D answers z 1 ∈ g at random.
Step
Step 6. D uses the e-cash at a shop S * in the payment protocol. If D receives the random string cha from
The random oracles reply at random and record the query and answer on their lists, if there is no particular description. In the above strategy, D can solve the DDH problem with non-negligible advantage. If (p, A, B, C, D) ∈ DH, log z z 1 = log A B = log C D = log ζ ζ 1 holds, and the e-cash can be produced only in run b . In fact, the blinding factors t 1 , {t 2,i , t 3,i , t 4,i , t 5,i } i can convert the V bB into the e-cash produced in step5. In run 1−b , however, the e-cash cannot be produced because log z z 1 log ζ ζ 1 with probability (1−negl 1 ). Hence, b depends on one of the runs. Therefore, D * that can break the untraceability for honest users with (V 0B * , V 1B * , V S * ) can output correct b with probability of at least ( 1 2 + )(1 − negl 1 ). On the other hand, when (p, A, B, C, D) ∈ R\DH, log z z 1 = log A B log C D = log ζ ζ 1 holds in both runs. Thus the e-cash generated in Step5 cannot have the blinding factors t 1 , {t 2,i , t 3,i , t 4,i , t 5,i } i that convert either V 0B * or V 1B * into e-cash with probability (1 − negl 2 ). Hence, b is independent of both runs, and b = b holds with probability
When Π is chosen randomly in R, the probabilities Pr[Π ∈ DH|Π ← R R] = 
From the second term of Eq. (9),
We show that the DDH problem can be solved with the advantage at least (1 − 1 q )( − negl 1 − negl 2 ), which contradicts the DDH assumption when is not negligible.
Traceability against Dishonest Users
As we discuss later, we can assume that the proposed scheme is (l, l + 1)-unforgeable, so the user cannot generate another e-cash from the issued one. Therefore, {B i } i are not paid more than the issued e-cash if no one can use the same e-cash twice.
Theorem 3:
Assume that H 3 is a collision resistant hash function. In the proposed scheme, if a user U * uses the same e-cash twice maliciously, the honest bank B 0 can trace U * with overwhelming advantage.
Proof. The malicious user U * follows the ACMA & AIA manner. So U * can corrupt arbitrary users U * 0 , U * 1 , banks {B i } i and a shop S * except attack target bank B 0 . U * can execute the issuing protocol with B 0 . In arbitrary timing, each U * 0 and U * 1 controlled by U * executes the issuing protocol with B 0 , and U * outputs two different transaction histories that one of the e-cash is used.
Suppose that U * uses the same e-cash = (ζ, ζ 1 , ρ, 
Unforgeability
We will show that the proposed scheme satisfies unforgeability against ACMA & AIA in the random oracle model. The proof is done by reducing the forging problem of the blind signature scheme [9] with the single signer to that of the proposed e-cash scheme. Namely, given a public key (p, q, g, h, y, z) for the signer of the blind signature scheme [9] and a corresponding signing oracle O Σ , our aim is to construct the forging algorithm F against the blind signature scheme [9] with the forger F M against the proposed e-cash scheme. Note that, since the blind signature scheme [9] is proven to be unforgeable under the DL assumption in the random oracle model, the reduction shows that the proposed scheme is also unforgeable. lemma 1: In the proposed scheme, the probability that F succeeds in extracting n − 1 private keys corresponding to the public keys registered by F M is at least ( 
Proof. The forger F M can arbitrarily generate a set of keys (pk * , sk * ), and register pk * to the PKI as a public key of the corrupted bank B * . When F M registers pk * with probability , from the soundness of ZKIP [20] , F can extract sk * with probability (1 − . Therefore, we can assume that F M who registers pk * with non-negligible probability knows sk * and that ZKIP is performed properly ( = 1). So the probability that F succeeds in obtaining n − 1 private keys corresponding to registered public keys by F M is at least (1 − 1 q ) n−1 .
Theorem 4:
The proposed scheme is (l, l + 1)-unforgeable against ACMA & AIA if DLP is intractable in the random oracle model.
Proof. There are two kinds of forgery against the proposed e-cash scheme, namely, forgery with respect to the issuing bank B 0 and that with respect to a guaranteeing bank B j , but our proof considers both attacks. In each case, if we can prove F M can (l, l + 1)-forge the e-cash with non-negligible success probability, then F can (l, l + 1)-forge the blind signature of [9] with non-negligible probability. Firstly, we prove the unforgeability with respect to B 0 . Suppose that F M forges the e-cash issued by B 0 . For simplicity, assume that all banks and all shops except B 0 are corrupted by F M . Let 0 be the success probability of F M to (l, l + 1)-forge e-cash issued by B 0 and to use it at corrupted shops. Initializing: With the public key (p, q, g, h, y, z), F initializes the e-cash scheme.
Step 1. F sets (p, q, g, h, z) as the system parameter.
Step 2. F predicts an attack target bank B 0 , sets the public key of B 0 as y 1,0 ← y, y 2,0 ← g x 2,0 with a private key x 2,0 ∈ R Z q .
Step 3. F M issues the public keys for corrupted banks.
However, F M has to register the public keys to the PKI with ZKIP. So, F can extract such banks' private keys by rewinding ZKIP.
Step 4. F M can register the public key for users to the PKI.
Forging e-cash and transaction histories:
For the queries of issuing the e-cash from F M , therefore, we simulate the answer of each oracle as follows.
• • Simulation of B 0 :
Step 1. If B 0 is given a list of banks L, msg, σ U and ID U by F M , B 0 checks the validity of σ U . When σ U is valid, B 0 chooses m ∈ {0, 1} * at random and asks a signature for message m to the signing oracle O Σ and receives a commitment (a 0 , b 1,0 , b 2,0 ,rnd).
Step 2. B 0 asks the guaranteeing banks in rnd, L, msg, σ U and ID U for guarantees and receives
with non-negligible probability.
Transform the e-cash to the blind signatures: We can extract (l, l + 1)-forgery for Abe's blind signatures [9] from utilizing the (l, l + 1)-forged e-cash as follows.
and other banks' secret keys {x 2, j } j∈L\{0} ,
Therefore, F succeeds in (l, l + 1)-forging the signature of
. Evaluation: The success probability of F is evaluated as follows.
The probability with which F hits the prediction in the initialization phase is at least 1/n. From the lemma 1, the probability that F obtains corrupted banks' private keys is at least (1 − 1 q ) n−1 . For sufficiently large q,
where e is Napier's constant. So, the probability 1 that F succeeds in outputting (l, l + 1)-forgeries is
Secondly, we prove the unforgeability with respect to a guaranteeing bank. The procedure is almost the same as the previous one. In the initialization phase, F guesses a bank B j which is attacked, and sets its guaranteeing public key y 2, j = y. Other keys are decided in the manner described above. The other procedure is almost the same as the previous one. F succeeds in (l, l + 1)-forging if the guesses are correct. Therefore, we show that if F M with non-negligible probability 0 exists, F with non-negligible probability exists. However, Abe's blind signature scheme [9] is proved unforgeable if the DL problem is intractable, and then, such F does not exist. So we can prove that F M dose not exist under the DL assumption in the random oracle model.
Since every execution of the issuing protocol needs the fresh signature of U, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 5:
If a user disagrees to issue e-cash, no one can correctly execute the issuing protocol even if all banks collude with one another, under the assumption of EUF-ACMA secure signature scheme.
From theorem 1 to 5, the proposed scheme is secure if the DDH problem is intractable.
Discussion
This section compares the proposed scheme with two simple constructions in terms of the size of e-cash (signature length) and the computation cost. One of the constructions is a scheme by concatenating the blind signatures signed by the several banks individually (named a simple concatenation), and the other is one by applying the conventional technique of the DL type multisignature to Abe's blind signature scheme (named a simple scheme). Let |p|, |q| and |L| be bit length of p,q and L, respectively. We name a simple combination of Abe's e-cash scheme and the conventional multisignature technique the simple scheme. A comparison of the three schemes is summarized in Table 1 .
We first discuss the size of e-cash. The size of e-cash in the simple concatenation is 2n|p| + 6n|q| + |L|, which is n times as large as that of Abe's blind signature scheme (except |L|). On the other hand, the remaining two schemes can decrease the size compared to the simple concatenation. In the simple scheme, each bank has an issuing key y i and an individual tag key z i . On the other hand, in our scheme, each bank has an issuing key y i and a common tag key z. The sizes of e-cash in the simple scheme and our scheme are 2n|p|+(5n+1)|q|+|L| and 2|p|+(5n+1)|q|+|L|, respectively. So our scheme can reduce the size of e-cash compared to the simple scheme by (2n − 2)|p| bits.
We then consider the computation cost. Let us denote the cost for one exponentiation in Z * p by C exp . The costs for each bank to issue the e-cash are the same (5C exp ) in these schemes. Our scheme can reduce the cost for the other entities (S and U). In particular, our scheme decreases the issuing cost by about 4n and 3n exponentiations compared to the simple concatenation and the simple scheme, respectively; and the payment cost is one over n compared to the simple concatenation and the simple scheme.
Conclusion
We discussed the formal security model of the untraceable e-cash scheme with plural banks against the non-restricted attack manner. We then presented the provably secure ecash scheme with the blind multisignature scheme under the DDH assumption in the random oracle model. This scheme is the first one that is secure against the non-restricted attack manner. 
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